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Abstract
Many political theorists are multiculturalists. They believe that states ought to sup-
port and accommodate minority cultures, even if they disagree about when such 
support and accommodations are due and what forms they should take. In this con-
tribution, I argue that multiculturalists have failed to notice an important objection 
against a wide range of multiculturalism policies. This objection is predicated on 
the notion that when states support and accommodate minority cultures, they should 
support and accommodate many subcultures and individualistic conceptions of the 
good as well. However, since a significant proportion of multiculturalism policies 
imposes financial costs on society, it will often be prohibitively expensive for states 
to support and accommodate citizens’ subcultures and individualistic conceptions 
of the good on an equal basis. The result is that implementing such policies is likely 
to end up discriminating against certain groups, which might include e.g. fervent 
football fans, globe-trotters, mountain climbers, motor bikers, Hippies, and artists. 
I conclude by considering six reasons for giving preferential treatment to minority 
cultures that would allow multiculturalists to avoid this implication, which invoke, 
inter alia, the depth, duration, and involuntariness of cultural commitments; the role 
of culture in allowing people to live autonomously; and cultural rights to political 
self-determination. None are found to be convincing.
Keywords Multiculturalism · Minority rights · Discrimination · Majority cultures · 
Subcultures · Will Kymlicka
Introduction
Multiculturalism is the doctrine that states should not merely allow cultural diversity 
to exist (construed broadly to include religious diversity) as is required by liberal-
democratic rights to freedom of association, conscience, religion, and speech. They 
should also support and accommodate cultural groups when, and because, these 
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groups are disadvantaged relative to other cultural groups within society, which 
might be because they find it more difficult to survive or flourish and/or because 
they derive fewer advantages from state policies. (I shall henceforth refer to policies 
that offer such support and accommodations as ‘multiculturalism policies’.) Since 
minority cultures are more likely to satisfy these criteria than majority cultures, the-
ories of multiculturalism have focused mostly on when and how states should sup-
port and accommodate minority cultures,1 and so will I within this contribution.
Whereas support for multiculturalism is widespread among scholars (e.g. Kym-
licka 1995; Modood 2013; Parekh 2006; Patten 2014; Shachar 2001; Taylor 1994), 
this contribution seeks to strengthen the anti-multiculturalist case by raising a novel 
objection against a wide range of multiculturalism policies. This objection is predi-
cated on the notion that when states support and accommodate minority cultures, 
they should support and accommodate many subcultures and individualistic concep-
tions of the good as well. However, since a significant proportion of multicultural-
ism policies imposes financial costs on society, it will often be prohibitively expen-
sive for states to support and accommodate citizens’ subcultures and individualistic 
conceptions of the good on an equal basis. The result is that implementing such poli-
cies is likely to end up discriminating against certain groups, which might include 
e.g. fervent football fans, globe-trotters, mountain climbers, motor bikers, Hippies, 
and artists. I conclude by considering six reasons for giving preferential treatment to 
minority cultures that would allow multiculturalists to avoid this implication, which 
invoke, inter alia, the depth, duration, and involuntariness of cultural commitments; 
the role of culture in allowing people to live autonomously; and cultural rights to 
political self-determination. None are found to be convincing.
Multiculturalism Policies
Before looking at the discrimination objection in more detail, we need to get greater 
clarity on what multiculturalism policies are and when they are believed to be due 
by those who defend them. I have defined multiculturalism policies as policies that 
assist and accommodate cultural groups (construed broadly to include religious 
groups) when, and because, these groups are disadvantaged relative to other cul-
tural groups within society, which might be because they find it more difficult to 
survive or flourish and/or because they derive fewer advantages from state policies. 
Examples of such policies include, but are not limited to, subsidies for cultural fes-
tivals and community centres; special legal rights for linguistic minorities (think of 
the right of the Quebecois to require companies with 50 or more employees to use 
French as the primary language of communication); legal exemptions for minority 
religions (think of the right of the Amish to pull their children out of school before 
the legal age); and political self-determination rights for historical minorities and 
indigenous groups (think of the right of Native-American tribes to govern them-
selves on their reservations).
1 But see Orgad (2015) for a defence of majority culture rights.
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To avoid confusion, it bears emphasis that state policies only qualify as multicul-
turalist when they have the aim of helping members of the disadvantaged cultures 
live in accordance with their culture.2 This means that not all policies that bestow 
benefits on disadvantaged cultures—which, as was mentioned, are usually those of 
minorities, which is why my focus will be on minority cultures from hereon—fall 
under the header of multiculturalism policies, as some of these policies do so with-
out seeking to promote people’s cultures as such. (Another way of making this point 
is to say that the cultural benefits that they bestow are a side effect.) Without trying 
to provide an exhaustive list, one might think of policies with the following aims:
Providing universal services: Such policies make generic goods available to 
cultural and non-cultural groups alike, such as police services and fire-protec-
tion. Since the provision of these goods is not meant to promote the interests 
of (minority) cultures specifically, policies that fall into this category are not 
plausibly conceived of as multiculturalism policies. (cf. Patten 2014, p. 121)
Securing the fair value of rights: Whilst such policies do offer tailored support 
to minority cultures, they do so in order to help their members exercise their 
legal rights rather than to support or accommodate their cultures as such. To 
ensure a fair trial, for instance, the proceedings of a court might be translated 
into a minority language when the accused’s grasp of the majority language is 
poor.
Respecting historical agreements: Such policies support and accommodate 
minority cultures when, and because, this is necessary for honouring agree-
ments that these groups made with the state. An example may be found in the 
educational exemptions that Canada has granted to the Hutterites for populat-
ing the western frontier (cf. Kymlicka 1995, pp. 116–120). As with the previ-
ous categories, one need not be a multiculturalist in order to endorse such poli-
cies; all that is necessary is that one believes that pacta sunt servanda.
Rectifying injustice: Such policies support and accommodate minority cultures 
when, and because, this helps to rectify injustices that these groups have suf-
fered at the state’s hands (and might in some cases continue to do so). For 
example, a state might grant local political autonomy to minority cultures that 
have been oppressed by it for a significant period, such as Native-Americans 
in the United States and Catalans in Spain. To support this, one again does not 
need to be a multiculturalist; all that is required is that one deems it pertinent 
that injustices be remedied.
Avoiding evils: Such policies support and accommodate minority cultures on 
pragmatic grounds. For example, a Western state might allow an East-African 
community to engage in a modest form of female genitalia cutting in order to 
ensure that it occurs under proper medical supervision rather than unsuper-
vised in private with significantly greater health risks (cf. Levy 2000). Another 
example is when a state grants local political autonomy to a minority culture in 
order to prevent its members from causing (further) social unrest. Since states 
2 Which does not mean, of course, that this must be their only aim.
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do not seek to promote specific cultures in such cases but rather to avoid cer-
tain evils, these kinds of policies are not plausibly construed as multicultural-
ism policies either.
There are broadly two (mutually compatible) views on when multiculturalism poli-
cies are due, and, correspondingly two versions of multiculturalism. On the first ver-
sion, multiculturalism policies are due when state policies confer special benefits 
on majority cultures (whether intentionally or unintentionally) in order to rectify 
the resulting cultural inequalities (Kymlicka 1995, pp. 107–115; Modood 2013, pp. 
34–79; Patten 2014, pp. 149–185). Whilst this defence of multiculturalism policies 
is conditional upon states creating cultural inequalities in the first place, proponents 
of the current version correctly believe that this is often impossible to avoid. Within 
societies with high levels of linguistic diversity, for instance, state organisations 
will usually be able to operate in a limited number of languages only; since these 
will need to be languages that large sections of their populations speak to allow for 
effective communication, some cultures within these societies are bound to receive 
greater benefits than others. And even when it is possible to implement policies that 
do not suit any cultural group, some multiculturalists maintain that there are reasons 
of beneficence for desisting from this. For example, even when a state can pick a 
national day of rest that is not amenable to any religion within society, Patten (2014, 
p. 170) has argued that there are good grounds for accommodating the preferred day 
of some religion to make it easier for its adherents to worship.
The compensation that states provide for the cultural biases of their policies might 
either take a pro-rated or welfarist form. Under a pro-rated scheme, the benefits that 
multiculturalism policies bestow on minority cultures should have the same per cap-
ita value as the special benefits that state policies confer on majority culture (for a 
defence of this view, see Patten 2014). This allows for the possibility that citizens 
with different cultures will benefit from per capita equal support to unequal degrees. 
Such differences might arise, for instance, when the number or spread of individuals 
with the same culture is such that only some cultural groups will enjoy economies 
of scale or be able to afford certain lumpy goods. Under a welfarist scheme, in con-
trast, states will try to reduce at least some of these inequalities, which means that 
they may end up giving goods to minority cultures that are worth more than the per 
capita value of the benefits that their policies conferred on majority cultures (for 
defences of this view, see e.g. Réaume 2017, p. 69; De Schutter 2017, pp. 77–78; 
Pierik and Van Der Burg 2014, p. 501). For example, when a state subsidises the 
publication of books within the majority language and seeks to compensate a small 
linguistic minority for this by subsidising the publication of books in its language, 
then given that the publication of books tends to become cheaper the more of them 
are ordered, the linguistic minority might be given subsidy with a greater per capita 
value so that the money granted will be equally useful to its members.
On the second version, multiculturalism policies are due simply when it is more 
difficult for minority cultures to survive or flourish than it is for majority cultures, 
at least when these cultures are not hostile to liberal democracy (for defences of 
this view, see e.g. Cohen 1999; Lippert-Rasmussen 2017). What this means is that 
minority cultures might have claims to state support and accommodations regardless 
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of whether the fact that it is harder for them to survive or flourish is (partially) due to 
majority biases of state policies. (To avoid confusion, notice that proponents of this 
version of multiculturalism are not committed to the view that states ought to guar-
antee the survival and flourishing of any minority culture; insofar as offering such 
guarantees is possible at all, they might believe that this would be too expensive, 
require too much coercion, and/or assign too little responsibility to people for the 
fate of their own culture.)
The Discrimination Objection
Having clarified the notion of multiculturalism policies and considered when such 
policies are believed to be due, my aim in this section is to propose a novel objec-
tion against a wide range of multiculturalism policies. In so doing, I do not mean to 
suggest that this the only compelling objection against multiculturalism. For reasons 
of space, I will not be able to go into the objections raised by authors such as Barry 
(2002, pp. 34–35); Kukathas (2012, pp. 40–41), and Scheffler (2007, p. 107), though 
I believe that there is some truth to their critiques.
According to the objection that I want to raise here, many multiculturalism poli-
cies discriminate against citizens3 whose conceptions of the good are not tied to par-
ticipation within a specific cultural community, or at least not the types of communi-
ties that multiculturalists seek to support and accommodate. Examples include, but 
are not limited to, conceptions of the good that revolve around globe-trotting, moun-
tain climbing, sailing, rock music, body-building, motor biking, hunting, producing 
abstract art, participating in Deadhead, Goth, and Hippy communities, supporting a 
particular football team, practising and promoting Effective Altruism, playing and 
collecting board-games, competing in marathons, and doing yoga. Some of these 
activities might be part of specific subcultures—think, for instance, of communi-
ties of runners, body-builders, motor biking, Goths, Hippies, and hunters in some 
places—and I will refer to conceptions of the good that are structured around such 
cultures as ‘subcultural conceptions of the good’. However, these are not the types 
of cultures that can count on state support and accommodations under theories of 
multiculturalism, which are normally confined to the cultures of national minori-
ties (e.g. the Quebecois, Frisians, Catalans, Scots); indigenous communities (e.g. the 
Pueblo, Nunavut, Sami, Aboriginals), and groups of immigrants (e.g. Muslim and 
Hindu immigrants in Western Europe). Another category of conceptions of the good 
that does not qualify for state support and accommodations under theories of mul-
ticulturalism are those that I term ‘individualistic’. Individualistic conceptions are 
not structured around participation in the traditions and practices of a (sub)cultural 
community, but rather around activities in which the holders engage more or less by 
themselves. Paradigmatic examples include the conceptions of the good of hermits 
and lone artists. However, they may also revolve around activities that are part of 
3 The same might be true of groups of non-citizens. For the purposes of this contribution, my focus will 
be on citizens.
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certain subcultures yet in which the relevant agents engage (largely) independently, 
such as motor-biking, running, and sailing.
The objection that a significant share of multiculturalism policies discriminates 
against citizens with subcultural and individualistic conceptions of the good might 
be formulated as follows:
(1) Many multiculturalism policies support and accommodate minority cultures in 
ways that impose (net) financial costs on societies.
(2) A large proportion of citizens with subcultural and individualistic conceptions 
of the good have claims to state support and accommodations that are at least 
as strong as the claims of citizens with cultural conceptions of the good.
(3) When a state S grants a specific good to a group A, then insofar as another group 
B has at least as strong a claim to a similar good, then S should grant that good 
to B.
(4) Because of (2) and (3), states that implement costly multiculturalism policies 
should also support and accommodate a large proportion of citizens with sub-
cultural and individualistic conceptions of the good even when this is costly.
(5) Extending costly support and accommodations to these individuals is bound to 
be prohibitively expensive.
Therefore
(6) The implementation of many multiculturalism policies ends up discriminating 
against citizens with subcultural and individualistic conceptions of the good.
I believe that (2) is the most controversial premise. Before vindicating it within the 
next section, I want to comment on some of the other premises.
Multiculturalism policies (construed broadly to include the accommodation of 
cultural diversity through the design of politico-legal institutions) that are likely to 
impose net financial costs on society include, inter alia, public subsidies for endan-
gered minority languages, ethnic minority festivals, the construction of places of 
worship for minority religions, and the provision of Halal or Kosher food within 
predominantly secular or Christian societies. However, they might also include state 
recognition of cultural self-government rights when devolution raises bureaucratic 
costs, as well as cultural/religious exemptions from laws when the exempted are not 
required, or simply not able, to fully absorb the costs of their exemptions. For exam-
ple, Sikhs who are exempted from motor helmet laws may not be able to fully cover 
the costs of any aggravated head injuries that they sustain as a result of not wearing 
a helmet when driving.
Most multiculturalists believe that, at least up to a point, it is fair for societies to 
bear these kinds of costs. The reason why they seem to believe that it is fair towards 
members of minority cultures is that these individuals are presumed to benefit from 
multiculturalism policies, whereas the reason why they seem to believe that it is fair 
towards members of majority cultures is that the cultures of these individuals enjoy 
certain advantages that minority cultures lack (as we have seen in ‘Multiculturalism 
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Policies’ section, these might consist of the fact that state policies confer greater 
benefits on them and/or of the fact that it is easier for them to survive or flourish). 
Insofar as societies can be divided into majority and minority cultures without 
remainder—as multiculturalists also seem to assume—this would suggest that no 
one is treated unfairly by the financial costs of multiculturalism policies.
Suppose arguendo that contemporary societies, or at least contemporary liberal 
democracies on which I focus within this contribution, can indeed be divided into 
majority and minority cultures without remainder. A problem remains in that case, 
namely that not all members of majority and minority cultures place much value 
upon their culture’s traditions and practices and instead hold what I have termed 
subcultural or individualistic conceptions of the good. Since these individuals have 
equally legitimate interests in living self-directed lives, forcing them to bear the 
costs of multiculturalism policies appears unfair.
To make the problem more concrete, consider the subsidies that the Dutch gov-
ernment provides for the publication of books in Frisian, a language spoken by an 
ethnic minority within the north of the Netherlands. Given that virtually all Frisian 
speakers are fluent in Dutch (and therefore do not need access to Frisian books in 
order to quench their reading thirst), the question arises how it can be fair to force 
non-Frisian taxpayers to help fund these subsidies when they care very little, if at 
all, about the preservation of the Frisian language and Frisian culture more generally 
(as is the case for a substantial share). Similarly, we need to know how it can be fair 
to force Frisians who are (largely) indifferent to the preservation of their language 
and culture more broadly to help pay for these subsidies. After all, insofar as these 
groups are not required to make these expenses, they might be able to spend the 
money that is saved on their own conceptions of the good. Alternatively, the Dutch 
government might invest the money in various public goods, such as healthcare and 
infrastructure, which would benefit them as well.
Some multiculturalists might say that subsidising the publication of Frisian books 
is fair because the Dutch government also subsidises Dutch literature, movies, and 
music (and even if this were not the case, the mere fact that it is easier for Dutch cul-
ture to survive and flourish might be considered an adequate justification by some of 
them). The problem with this response is that a significant proportion of Frisian and 
non-Frisian taxpayers who care little, if at all about Frisian literature also care little, 
if at all about Dutch literature, movies, and music, or, indeed, the various traditions 
and practices associated with Dutch culture more generally. For this to be the case, 
they need not actively dislike these traditions and practices (e.g. they need not con-
sider the Saint Nicholas tradition with its controversial character of Black Pete rac-
ist, oppose the monarchy, or find football and ice-skating abhorrent), though some 
might. It suffices that compared to the activities that are central to their subcultural 
or individualistic conceptions of the good—e.g. globe-trotting, mountain climbing, 
sailing, rock music, body-building, motor biking, producing abstract art—the rel-
evant cultural traditions and practices simply play no significant role within their 
lives.
In response, multiculturalists might accept the problem but argue that using pub-
lic money to support and accommodate cultural conceptions of the good ceases to 
be unfair when states support and accommodate non-cultural conceptions of the 
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good under similar conditions. Though such levelling-up would avoid the unfairness 
charge, I believe that on each of the two major accounts of when multiculturalism 
policies are due (see ‘Multiculturalism Policies’ section), extending such support and 
accommodations will be prohibitively expensive. Consider first the version of mul-
ticulturalism that requires the state to help minority cultures survive or flourish irre-
spective of whether it is responsible for the facts that these cultures find it more diffi-
cult to survive or flourish than majority cultures. Even if we accept a less demanding 
variation on this view, according to which costly state support and accommodations 
are due only when minority cultures struggle to survive, it is doubtful whether simi-
lar support and accommodations can be granted to all those citizens who struggle to 
live in accordance with their tolerable subcultural and individualistic conceptions of 
the good. The reason for this is that a great many citizens with such conceptions of 
the good find themselves in this situation. Just think of those who can barely fund 
their passion for globe-trotting, mountain climbing, or sailing (all of which are very 
expensive activities), or of those who simply lack enough like-minded individuals 
within their region to engage in activities that are central to their conceptions of the 
good (this might be the predicament of fervent football players within parts of the 
US and of fervent American football players within parts of Europe).
Things do not get much better on the other version of multiculturalism, according 
to which multiculturalism policies are due when state policies confer special ben-
efits on majority cultures in order to rectify the resulting cultural inequalities. The 
first thing to note here is that whether the pro-rated or welfarist interpretation of 
this view is accepted, states will already incur significant costs in order to compen-
sate minority cultures for the (in many cases inevitable) ways in which state poli-
cies favour majority cultures, as discussed within ‘Multiculturalism Policies’ sec-
tion. However, when subcultures and individualistic conceptions of the good ought 
to be compensated as well—imagine that as compensation for subsidising Dutch lit-
erature, the Dutch government does not only have to subsidise Frisian literature, but 
also globe-trotting, mountain climbing, sailing, and numerous other tolerable activi-
ties that are central to at least some citizens’ conceptions of the good—the costs are 
likely to be excessive.
The same is true when instead of compensating subcultures and individualistic 
conceptions of the good for special benefits that state policies bestow on majority 
cultures, states compensate them for any special benefits that their policies confer 
on other subcultures and individualistic conceptions. This might mean, for instance, 
that when a local government constructs a skateboard park, football players, basket-
ball players, tennis players, squash players, and those with passions for various other 
sports will need to be compensated (this is in fact Patten’s (2014, p. 122) view, who 
suggests that such a government should also build ice rinks, squash halls, and so 
on). Likewise, when a state decides to build a new art museum, opera-lovers, ballet-
lovers, etc. might be owed compensation for this. The problem with this approach 
is that given how diverse contemporary liberal democracies are, most policies that 
states might implement are likely to bestow unequal benefits on citizens’ different 
cultures, subcultures, or individualistic conceptions of the good, such that compen-
sation will be due in a huge number of cases. (An even more ambitious and therefore 
unrealistic approach requires states to compensate all tolerable conceptions of the 
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good within society for special benefits that are bestowed upon any other concep-
tion of the good within society; for further discussion of the problems with such an 
approach, see Martin 2017, p. 158.)
Can a Cultural Exceptionialism be Vindicated?
If the foregoing is correct, then costly multiculturalism policies can be justified only 
when there are reasons for supporting and accommodating members of minority 
cultures with cultural conceptions of the good that do not similarly require states 
to support and accommodate most citizens with tolerable subcultural and individu-
alistic conceptions of the good. Absent such reasons, it appears that implementing 
costly multiculturalism policies will end up discriminating against the latter because 
of the financial unfeasibility of granting them similar support and accommodations. 
This final section considers six potential differences that might justify such a ‘cul-
tural exceptionalism’. Whereas space constraints prevent me from discussing each 
would-be difference in detail, I hope to say enough about them to show that there are 
good grounds for doubting their ability to disarm the discrimination objection.
A first would-be difference is that the cultural commitments of citizens with cul-
tural conceptions of the good are more important to their lives than the subcultural 
and individualistic commitments of citizens with subcultural and individualistic 
conceptions of the good are to theirs. This might be due to the fact that cultural com-
mitments are deeper (i.e. more central to people’s identities and life goals) and/or 
that they last longer than subcultural and individualistic ones.
Even if this is true in some cases, there seem to be many counter-examples where 
people’s subcultural and individualistic commitments are every bit as important to 
their lives as the cultural (including religious) commitments of other people are to 
theirs. To mention just a few, Martin (2017, p. 152) has rightly noted that many foot-
ball supporters ‘believe that they have a strong obligation to support a given team, 
such that it becomes virtually ritualistic, and in spite of constraints from work, fam-
ily and so on’. Similarly, for a large share of artists, producing art is the one of the 
main purposes of their existence as evinced by the fact that many are willing to live 
on a subsistence level to be able to do so, just as running, motor biking, and moun-
tain climbing are not merely hobbies for various groups of individuals but a deep 
source of meaning and major component of their identity (indeed, in the case of 
mountain climbing, it is something that some are willing to run the risk of dying 
for). And whilst it is true that some subcultural and individualistic commitments 
tend to be relatively short-lived, such as identification with the Goth subculture, 
many others—including the ones just mentioned—often last for most of people’s 
lives.
A second would-be difference has been suggested by Kymlicka, who has argued 
that access to a stable cultural community is necessary for people to live autono-
mously by providing them with a meaningful range of lifestyle options (1991, pp. 
165–166). I believe that there are two problems with this view. One is that it leaves 
unclear why it would be wrong to use the money spent on multiculturalism poli-
cies in order to help members of minority cultures integrate or assimilate into the 
 B. de Vries 
1 3
majority culture, which would also secure a meaningful range of lifestyle options 
for them if successful (and possibly a wider range, especially when the relevant 
minority cultures are more illiberal than the majority culture). Indeed, since such an 
integrationist/assimilationist approach will usually be cheaper than supporting and 
accommodating struggling minority cultures, it has the advantage that it imposes 
fewer costs on society. Another problem is that access to specific cultural communi-
ties does not seem necessary for an autonomous life. Lives devoted to, inter alia, 
sailing, globe-trotting, mountain climbing, rock music, body-building, motor biking, 
producing abstract art, supporting a particular football team, and practising and pro-
moting Effective Altruism can all be perfectly self-directed, it seems, even though 
none of these activities are tied to membership of a specific cultural community (cf. 
Waldron 1991), or at least not the types of communities that multiculturalists seek to 
support and accommodate.
A third would-be difference is that cultural conceptions of the good are usually 
involuntarily acquired whereas subcultural and individualistic ones are not. Insofar 
as agents bear greater moral responsibility for the costs of voluntarily acquired con-
ceptions of the good than for the costs of those that were not voluntarily acquired 
(as luck-egalitarians would contend), this would suggest that refusing costly state 
support and accommodations to (most) citizens with subcultural and individualistic 
of the good may be justifiable. However, the empirical premise of this argument is 
dubious. Not only do people sometimes deliberately seek to develop a specific cul-
tural or religious conception of the good (which might involve them joining another 
cultural or religious group), many of us had our passion for football, mountain 
climbing, motor biking, rock music, abstract art, and so on instilled in us by our par-
ents or by our wider social milieu.
A fourth would-be difference is that when citizens’ cultural conceptions of the 
good are not supported and accommodated by the state, they are more likely to 
experience diminutions in their self-respect than when citizens with subcultural and 
individualistic conceptions are denied support and accommodations. Whilst this 
might be correct, e.g. Kramer (2017, pp. 324–325) has plausibly argued that what 
contributes to the goodness of people’s lives is warranted self-respect rather than 
sheer self-respect. This helps to explain why, for instance, the fact that a racist’s 
self-respect might be diminished when her government grants equal rights to a hith-
erto oppressed racialised group seems to carry no moral weight. Yet if what matters 
morally is warranted self-respect rather than sheer self-respect, then it still needs 
to be shown that members of minority cultures would be justified in experiencing 
(greater) losses of self-respect.
A fifth would-be difference applies exclusively to minority cultures with their 
own language. It says that states should facilitate the use of minority languages in 
parliament and provide public services within the relevant languages despite the 
costs that this imposes, for if this is not done, the relevant speakers will have reduced 
access to their political, social, and civil rights.
Two replies are in order. First, given that the aim of such accommodations is to 
secure access to rights rather than promote minority cultures as such, I have sug-
gested in ‘Multiculturalism Policies’ section that they are not plausibly conceived of 
as multiculturalism policies. However, even if they are classified as such—and this 
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brings me to the second point—they will be due in a limited set of cases only. To the 
extent that members of linguistic minorities are fluent within the majority language 
(assuming that this is the language of the public sector, which is usually the case), 
such as Frisians within the Netherlands, they will have no claims to having their 
language accommodated based on the current rationale. But that is not all; insofar 
as eliminating linguistic barriers to the exercise of people’s rights is what matters, 
there is another way in which states might realise this than through multi-lingual 
accommodations. They can take measures to ensure that younger generations of 
linguistics minorities all become fluent within the majority language, which would 
allow them to abolish the relevant multi-lingual accommodations within the future. 
Indeed, since such a strategy is cheaper than accommodating minority cultures in 
perpetuum, it has an important advantage over its multiculturalist contender.
A final would-be difference is predicated on the notion that cultural communities 
have moral rights to political self-determination that other groups lack, including 
various subcultures. To honour these rights, the argument goes, states should allow 
minority cultures to govern themselves politically even if this raises bureaucratic 
costs. In addition to this, they might have a duty to (financially) support these cul-
tures when this helps to create conditions under which political self-determination 
becomes easier for them, the assumption being that the stronger the cultural ties 
among individuals, the more likely it is that they will be willing and able to (con-
tinue to) govern themselves politically. (For defences of multiculturalism policies 
along these lines, see e.g. Bauböck 2017; Kymlicka 2018.)
Since this argument for multiculturalism policies is conditional upon minority cul-
tures having moral rights to political determination, it seems that, if sound, it can only 
justify political recognition of, and public support for, national minorities (think of 
the Quebecois and Catalans) and indigenous groups (think of the Pueblo and Nuna-
vut). Were cultural communities of recent immigrants to have moral rights to politi-
cal self-determination as well, this would render it morally permissible for people to 
colonise another state’s territory, which I take to be a reductio even if the self-govern-
ment rights to which they would be entitled would not allow them to secede unilater-
ally from the host country (cf. Bauböck 2017, pp. 18–19; Kymlicka 2018, p. 85).
Yet even for national minorities and indigenous groups, I believe that cultural 
rights to political self-determination cannot ground entitlements to costly multicul-
turalism policies. If, as I assume, the function of rights is to protect the interests of 
the right-holders (Raz 1988), then the costs that such policies impose on societies 
must be justified that the interests that members of minority cultures have in politi-
cal self-determination. What might these be? The most plausible answer, it seems, is 
that being part of a politically self-governing cultural community promotes the per-
sonal autonomy and well-being of some of their members. However, we have seen 
that the same is true of, inter alia, sailing, mountain climbing, motor-biking, body-
building, producing abstract art, supporting a particular football team, and practising 
and promoting Effective Altruism for individuals with subcultural- and individual-
istic conceptions of the good (some of whom, it bears mentioning, might be part of 
the same minority cultures). These activities are often at least as important to their 
personal autonomy and well-being as political self-determination is to the personal 
autonomy and well-being of those with cultural conceptions of the good. But if this 
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true, then given that citizens with subcultural- and individualistic conceptions of the 
good have equally legitimate interests in pursuing their conceptions, forcing them to 
subsidise the latter’s wish to be part of a politically self-governing cultural commu-
nity fails to respect their moral status.
The following objection might be raised at this point: If cultural communi-
ties—including majority cultures and society-wide cultures that encompass multi-
ple smaller cultures—have no moral right to political self-determination when this 
imposes net costs on society, by which I mean that more public money must be spent 
to realise the goals of justice and stability as well compared to a situation where the 
relevant communities lack political autonomy, then there seems nothing wrong for 
two countries to fuse against the will of their populations when this allows these 
goals to be met better, perhaps because of the economies of scale that are realised 
thus. In fact, it might even justify annexation of (part of) another state’s territory.
My response is that we do not need to postulate cultural rights to political self-
determination in order to explain why such fusions and annexations will generally 
be unjustifiable. There is another, more plausible explanation. This is that fusing 
countries against the will of their populations and annexing foreign territory is likely 
to have unacceptable costs in terms of justice and stability, apart from the fact that 
these things might violate people’s democratic rights (even when individuals are not 
entitled to political autonomy for their respective cultural communities, they might 
still have a moral right to decide about changes to the political entities of which they 
are part; whether this is so I leave for the reader to decide). Indeed, even when the 
relevant fusions and annexations could achieve the goals of justice and stability bet-
ter in the long term, the consternation and possible bloodshed that they are likely to 
cause in the short term will usually act as a side-constraint on their permissibility.
Conclusion
It appears, then, that there are no differences between cultural conceptions of the 
good and subcultural and individualistic ones that justify granting financially costly 
support and accommodations to the former but not to (most of) the latter. Yet if this 
is correct, then implementing costly multiculturalism policies is likely to end up dis-
criminating against citizens with subcultural and individualistic conceptions of the 
good because of the financial unfeasibility of extending similar benefits to them.
I want to end with three comments. The first is that these problems of general-
isability are not unique to multiculturalism policies that impose financial costs on 
society. They also plague at least some multiculturalism policies that impose liberty-
costs on society (possibly in addition to any financial costs that might be imposed). 
Consider again the Quebecois law that requires companies with 50 or more employ-
ees to use French as the primary language of communication; were governments 
to pass similar laws to protect activities that are central to citizens’ subcultural and 
individualistic conceptions of the good, the overall effects are likely to be deeply 
illiberal. Just imagine a state that required the users of public sports facilities to 
engage in sports that struggled to survive, along with requiring public radio stations 
to play music genres that were threatened with extinction; requiring public museums 
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to display endangered art genres; requiring company canteens to serve locally shot 
wildlife in order to support dying hunting scenes, and so on.
Having said that, and this brings me to the second point, I do not mean to sug-
gest that states should never implement costly policies that benefit minority cultures. 
They may have a duty to do so when this promotes justice and/or stability, and I have 
outlined several conditions in ‘Multiculturalism Policies’ section under which this is 
likely to be the case—e.g. when it helps to secure access to rights; when it is neces-
sary for honouring historical agreements; when it helps to rectify injustice. What is 
important for us is that this does not vindicate multiculturalism, as the reason for sup-
porting and accommodating minority cultures in such cases is instrumental, namely 
that it helps to realise weighty public objectives. (Accordingly, when the relevant sup-
port and accommodations no longer serve these objectives, they ought to be revoked.)
Third, some might argue that insofar as cultural support and accommodations are 
a necessary remedy for any injustices that states have visited on minority cultures, 
then this means that, in practice, many minority cultures will be due such support and 
accommodations. The reason for this, they might say, is that states routinely confer 
unfair advantages on majority cultures and unfair disadvantages on minority cultures. 
Though such remedial cultural support and accommodations do not classify as multi-
culturalism policies as I have defined the term (see ‘Multiculturalism Policies’ section), 
they might still serve the political agenda of a large proportion of multiculturalists.
My response is that when states are simply guilty of having bestowed unfair benefits 
on majority cultures, then this will not justify costly support and accommodations for 
members of minority cultures with cultural conceptions of the good, given that citizens 
with subcultural and individualistic conceptions will have also suffered injustice in such 
cases. Since extending costly support and accommodations to the latter is likely to be 
prohibitively expensive (see ‘The Discrimination Objection’ section), the best thing to 
do is not to compensate any group. It is only when states have stigmatised and oppressed 
minority cultures specifically that these groups might be due costly remedial support and 
accommodations. For this to be the case, two conditions must obtain. First, the injustices 
must not have been rectified or superseded.4 Second, there should not be better alterna-
tive ways of addressing the injustices, such as exclusively providing minority cultures 
with financial support and/or educational and employment opportunities. How often 
these conditions are satisfied in practice is a topic for another occasion, however.
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